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C’est vraiment compliqué: a case study on
the delivery of maternal and child health
and nutrition interventions in the conflictaffected regions of Mali
Anushka Ataullahjan1* , Michelle F. Gaffey1, Moctar Tounkara2, Samba Diarra2,3, Seydou Doumbia2,3,
Zulfiqar A. Bhutta1,4 and Diego G. Bassani1

Abstract: Background: Mali is currently in the midst of ongoing conflicts which involve jihadist groups, rebels, and
the state. This conflict has primarily centered in the North of the country. Humanitarian actors delivering services in
these geographies must navigate the complex environment created by conflict. This study aimed to understand
how humanitarian actors make decisions around health service delivery within this context.
Methods: The current case-study utilized a mixed methods approach and focused on Mopti, Mali’s fifth
administrative region and fourth largest in population. Latent content analysis was used to analyze interview
transcripts guided by our research objectives and new concepts as they emerged. Indicators of coverage of health
interventions in the area of maternal and child health and nutrition were compiled using Mali’s National Evaluation
Platform and are presented for the conflict and non-conflict regions. Development assistance estimates for Mali by
year were obtained from the Developmental Assistance for Health Database compiled by the Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation. Administrative data was compiled from the annual reports of Mali’s Système Local
d’Information Sanitaire (SLIS), Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS).
Results: Our data suggests that the reaction of the funding mechanisms to the conflict in Mali was a major barrier
to timely delivery of health services to populations in need and the nature of the conflict is likely a key modifier of
such reaction patterns. Concerns have been raised about the disconnect between the very high administrative
capacity of large NGOs that control the work, and the consequent burden it puts on local NGOs. Population
displacement and inaccurate estimates of needs made it difficult for organizations to plan program services.
Moreover, actors delivering services to populations in need had to navigate an unpredictable context and
numerous security threats.
Conclusions: Our study highlights the need for a more flexible funding and management mechanism that can
better respond to concerns and issues arising at a local level. As the conflict in Mali continues to worsen, there is
an urgent need to improve service delivery to conflict-affected populations.
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Background
Since early 2012, the lives of many in Mali, especially
those living in the country’s northern regions, have been
disrupted by a complex and evolving conflict that has
led to high insecurity, unpredictable waves of civil unrest, and ongoing political instability [1].
The collapse of Libya in 2011 dispersed vast numbers
of armed Jihadist groups and their weapons to other
countries in the region, including Mali. This influx further exacerbated existing ethnic tensions in the country,
with violent conflict eventually erupting between local
ethnic minorities and the Malian government in Northern Mali in January 2012 [2]. This violence was the culmination of historical tensions between the government
and the Mouvement National pour la Libération de
l’Azawad (MNLA), a group comprised of ethnic minorities of northern Mali, fighters returning from Libya, and
deserting soldiers from the Malian army [3].
The origins of these tensions are best understood in
light of Mali’s history, varied geography and complex ethnic fabric that have combined to produce a rich culture
but also large developmental inequalities between regions,
perpetuating historical internal divisions [3]. Although internal tensions have existed for centuries, violence escalated when the MNLA joined forces with the Tuareg-led
Jihadist group Ansar Dine, the Algerian-based group AlQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and its west Africa offshoot, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in
West Africa (MOJWA) against the Malian government in
pursuit of greater autonomy and independence for northern Mali through the creation of the Azawad state. These
actors exploited pockets of population dissatisfaction with
the state in northern Mali and were able to garner initial
support against the Malian government [4].
In March 2012, the government’s inability to effectively address the violence and the evolving occupation of
Northern Mali by Jihadists resulted in a coup d’état that
exacerbated the instability and led the national army to
withdraw from the northern regions, resulting in the
rebel domination of most large cities in all four northern
regions [5]. The MNLA proclaimed the independence of
northern Mali shortly after, but by mid-2012 a wider
Jihadist-nationalist conflict emerged between the population, the MNLA, AQIM/MOJWA, and Ansar Dine [2].
Violence escalated in the region during the second half
of 2012, and in January 2013, by request of the Malian
government and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), French military intervention
began, soon resulting in the government reasserting control of the northern region and in a short-lived cease-fire
and realignment of the MNLA with the Malian government in the fight against the Jihadists.
The de-escalation of the conflict by the French military intervention was followed by the deployment, in
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early July 2013, of the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a
peacekeeping mission with the goal of stabilizing the region [6]. MNLA and the Malian government ended their
ceasefire in September 2013 and clashes between the
Jihadist groups and the state continued. Another ceasefire and subsequent peace agreement was signed on
April 2015, but expectations that the crisis was nearing
its end have not been realized. The agreement does not
formally apply to central Mali (Mopti region), where the
ethnic and religious nature of the conflict, led by radical
groups, has continued in contrast with the ending of the
rebellion in the north [6].
In a country still rife with ongoing insecurity, the transition of the humanitarian response into developmental
assistance continues to face multiple barriers [7] impacting international development assistance operations in
Mali. In March 2012, immediately after the coup d’état,
many large international donors halted their official development assistance to the country [5]. Those that did
not suspend activities shifted the management and delivery of their operations from government to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The move away
from supporting government-led programs seriously
compromised the functionality of the public health sector, which decreased further when medical officers and
regional health directors left the region due to the growing insecurity and, more specifically, the antigovernment nature of the tensions. The government
withdrawal from the region and the transition of donor
funding from increasingly centralized developmental assistance to decentralized humanitarian response in
northern Mali prompted the activation by the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) of the cluster system in 2012, to ensure
coordination of the provision of care to the conflictaffected populations [5].
Delivering programs and services to Mali’s 19.3 million
habitants is challenging for the more than 150 organizations operating in multiple sectors (protection, education, food security, water, sanitation, hygiene,
coordination, health, nutrition and shelter) [6]. Coordination of such a large number of actors is complex, the
evolving and unpredictable nature of the conflict makes
planning difficult, and both financial and human resources are limited. In 2017, staff from over 85% of these
organizations were targeted in carjacks or were victims
of theft and/or physical aggression during the course of
their work [6].
Identifying strategies to overcome the barriers to delivering services to conflict-affected populations is essential
in ensuring their health needs are met. As described
above, the ongoing conflict in northern Mali is complex,
as are its implications for service provision. This
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objectives of this study were to better understand the influence of the conflict on the planning, coordination and
delivery of maternal and child health and nutrition interventions in northern Mali; to identify the strategies used
to overcome obstacles to health intervention delivery
during the conflict; and to inform best practices in the
future delivery of health and nutrition services in Mali
and other conflict settings.

Methods
This study is part of a series of case-studies coordinated
by the BRANCH Consortium with the objective of understanding the delivery of reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and nutrition
programs in ten conflict-affected countries: Afghanistan,
Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The
current case-study used a mixed-methods approach [8]
and focused on Mopti, one of Mali’s administrative regions and fourth largest in population.
Document review

A desk review of the English and French language literature including peer-reviewed publications, program reports, and cluster meeting minutes was conducted to
identify relevant documents, also including searches of
relevant databases with publications and information
targeting and/or generated by humanitarian organizations. An exercise to map humanitarian activity in the
country since the beginning of the conflict was also conducted, using information available in program reports
and websites, ‘Who does What Where’ (3 W) maps [9],
and OCHA cluster meeting minutes.
Quantitative data

Indicators of coverage of health interventions in the area
of maternal and child health and nutrition were compiled using Mali’s National Evaluation Platform and are
presented for the conflict (Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Segou,
Tombouctou) and non-conflict (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro and Sikasso) regions of Mali separately [10, 11].
Development assistance estimates for Mali by year were
obtained from the Developmental Assistance for Health
Database compiled by the Institute for Health Metrics
and Evaluation [12]. Administrative data were compiled
from the annual reports of Mali’s Système Local d’Information Sanitaire (SLIS) from 2000 to 2016 [13] as well
as Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) [14–19] and
Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) [20, 21].
Qualitative data

Qualitative interviews were conducted between August
and September of 2018. Three male data collectors, with
previous experience in conducting qualitative interviews,
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were hired to conduct the interviews and were trained
on basic interview techniques and on the objectives of
the study. The data collectors had varying backgrounds
including training in anthropology, social sciences and
medicine.
Data were collected through semi-structured interviews lasting between one and 2 h. Participant observation was used on one occasion, when the study team
attended a health cluster meeting in Bamako and focused on the activities undertaken during the meeting,
as well as the interactions between different actors.
A total of 50 respondents, representing 50 different organizations were interviewed. Individuals were selected
using purposive sampling targeting organizations that
worked in any area of RMNCAH&N (Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, Child, Adolescent Health and Nutrition) in the Mopti region. These included UN agencies,
inter-governmental organizations, government, and
international and local non-governmental organizations
involved in the planning, coordination and delivery of
maternal and child health and nutrition interventions in
the northern regions of Mali. Target organizations were
identified during the document review phase and were
contacted by the study team (by telephone and/or email) to briefly present the study objectives. We then
identified individuals within these organizations who had
extensive experience in delivering services to conflictaffected populations and could speak to our study objectives and subsequently scheduled interviews. The data
collectors conducted interviews in locations that chosen
by the respondents, and the majority of the interviews
occurred at the respondents’ own offices.
A semi-structured interview guide included questions
focused on the organizations’ activities planned and/or
implemented during the period between 2013 and 2018.
Areas of investigation included understanding the role
of considerations such as the availability of finances,
health workers, and commodities on the decision making of humanitarian organizations embedded within a
specific sociocultural, and security context. The findings
presented within this manuscript are based on the 25
most informative interviews (Table 1).
Interviews were conducted in French, and audio recorded where permission was granted. One respondent
refused to have their interview recorded. Interviews were

Table 1 Description of respondents
Respondents

Number

Government Representatives

5

UN Agencies and Multi-Country Commissions

5

Local NGOs

2

International NGOs

13
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transcribed in French and excerpts were translated to
English for inclusion in this manuscript.
Latent content analysis was used to analyze the data.
Transcripts were manually coded in ATLAS.ti™. Local
investigators conducted the preliminary coding for the
analysis, with further coding and analysis conducted by
the team of investigators based in Canada. Member
checking was used to increase to the rigor of our analysis. Preliminary findings were shared with representatives from humanitarian organizations and regional
ministry of health officials during a dissemination meeting held in Bamako in December 2018. The discussions
that occurred during this meeting helped to further
guide and refine our analyses and interpretation of
results.
Our final analysis sought to explain the major
conflict-related factors affecting planning, coordination and delivery of maternal and child health and
nutrition interventions in northern Mali by integrating
the findings from: (i) the qualitative interviews, in
which members of the organizations describe their
perspectives; (ii) contextual information about the
conflict based on the document review; (iii) a descriptive quantitative analysis of several data sources containing information on the flow of financial resources
from international donors for developmental assistance in health into the country, number and timing
of conflict events and battle related deaths and (iv)
the coverage of interventions in the conflict and nonconflict affected regions of the country over time.
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Ethics approval was received from both the Research
Ethics Board from the Hospital for Sick Children and
the Faculty of Medicine and Odontostomatology at the
University of Sciences, Techniques and Technology of
Bamako, Mali.

Results
The estimated number of battle related deaths (BRDs) in
Mali rose sharply in 2012 and to a peak of nearly 900 in
2013, with a further spike to more than 500 in 2017
(Fig. 1). The number of internally displaced people (IDP)
was estimated to be 227,000 in 2012, and increased to
more than 250,000 in 2013. Even though IDPs started to
return to their areas of origin after 2013, the tensions
have not dissipated and the UN still classifies its Malian
peacekeeping mission as the deadliest of this decade
[22].
Mali currently has one of the world’s highest underfive mortality rates, estimated to be 106/1000 live births
in 2017, and very high maternal mortality rates, estimated to be 567/100,000 live births in 2017 (Fig. 2) [23].
These extremely high mortality rates are due in part to
longstanding difficulties in delivering and accessing
health services in Mali, especially for women and children; a situation that has been aggravated by the conflict.
The most recent national estimates, from the 2018 DHS,
indicate that only 67% of women deliver in health facilities, and only 67% of deliveries are attended by a health
provider [24]. Moreover, this national survey also demonstrated that 27% of children under 5 years of age were

Fig. 1 Number of Battle Related Deaths (BRDs), Internally Displaced Population (IDPs) in thousands, and Conflict Events - Mali 2004–2017
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Fig. 2 Under-5 mortality rates (per 1000 live births) and Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 live births) - Mali 2004–2017

stunted or suffered from chronic malnutrition [24].
These statistics indicate the need for increasing focused
services for women and children. Although there have
been improvements in many maternal health indicators
in Mali, regional variations continue to persist [25].
The qualitative interviews revealed that while conflict
is perceived as a pervasive contextual factor that impacts
maternal and child health and the health needs of the
population, it rarely figured prominently as an explicit
driver of program planning. The recency of the conflict
relative to funding and program implementation cycles
may account in part for the apparent downplay of its
role. However, this can also be interpreted as a consequence of the fragmentation of the program delivery
structures; at present, international donors fund international agencies that support their offices in Mali,
which, in turn, may partner with local organizations for
program delivery in the conflict-affected regions. In the
conflict areas, government withdrawal due to direct targeted attacks has resulted in a continuing reduction in
the number of functional health facilities: while 88% of
the government health facilities were functional in 2012,
the number of functional facilities in 2017 was 83% and
decreased to 78% in 2019 [26–28], mostly due to insecurity and the ongoing targeted attacks on health facilities and personnel [29]. The number of skilled health
workers has reduced by 31% and in addition, 80% of the
remaining health workers are paid by through international developmental assistance funds [6].
Although the security situation is often recognized as
an important barrier for program delivery, and an

important driver of operational costs, it did not emerge
as a factor directly connected to the early planning and
prioritization of programs and interventions. Instead, it
was clear, from multiple interviews, that the most prominent driver of program prioritization and planning were
donor demands. On that front, the conflict was perceived as a catalyst for stricter donor stipulations on
fund allocation, limiting the organizations’ ability to address changes in needs that result from the conflict. Respondents, and their organizations, struggled to
reconcile their recognition of the emerging population
needs with their inability to respond with appropriate
programming whenever these needs fell outside of the
scope of the funding available. Respondents did not differentiate between development and humanitarian donors when describing funding stipulations. The
following sections detail our findings describing how the
conflict affected internationally funded health programs
in Mali.
Funding: constraint and inflexibility

Donor inflexibility and the consequent difficulty in diverting funds to activities for which they were not earmarked was described in several interviews, and
respondents suggested these characteristics were exacerbated by the conflict. According to one respondent, the
presence of conflict increased donor’s concerns that
funds could be misappropriated and/or used to support
terrorist activities. Despite hypothesized justifications for
donor inflexibility, funding restrictions limited the organizations’ ability to comprehensively address the health
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needs of the population and even as the conflict unfolded, funded programs were rarely supplemented to
address the changing health needs or to accommodate
increases in the number of program beneficiaries due to
population displacement. Instead, they struggled to serve
larger populations within the allocated resources.
The amount of funding available for health programs
was impacted by the conflict, despite initial surges in the
overall amount of resources entering the country. Respondents noted during interviews that when the conflict began there was an immediate influx of funding,
however, it has not been sustained despite the continuation of the crisis.
As I said, in 2013 when [our organization] was hit
by the crisis, donors immediately mobilized resources
to help [us] intervene. Consequently, we had a lot of
resources. Since the situation started improving,
compared to the years of 2013 and 2014, resources
have been decreasing. (UN agency employee).
The analysis presented in Fig. 3 confirms this observation. In fact, during 2012, there appears to have been a
considerable decrease in funding available. As indicated
by our respondents, donor delays in releasing funds in
response to or as a consequence of the conflict, and even
complete interruptions in funding, are evident from an
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analysis of the Developmental Assistance for Health
Database, [12] where a dramatic reduction in financial
assistance flowing into Mali during 2012 is confirmed
(Fig. 3), with the increase in resources being observed
only in 2013, at least 11 months after the conflict
started.
The dramatic initial reduction in the total amount of
international assistance funding for Mali does not seem
to have been as prominent in health program funding,
however. That being said, the small but steady increase
in health financing for the country that started at least 5
years before the conflict has stalled since 2012. The lack
of a continued increase in the amount of international
assistance funding allocated to health is important when
one considers the increased health needs due to conflict.
There may also be important differences in the amount
of resources allocated to the conflict and non-conflict
areas, but it is not possible to investigate this as the data
are only available in aggregated form for the whole
country,
Funding restrictions and/or limitations meant that organizations needed to prioritize selected services even
though they felt comprehensive services were needed in
the conflict areas. A reduction in the geographic scope
of the programs was a common programmatic response
to the barriers imposed by inflexible funding structures
and the weaning amount of resources available.

Fig. 3 Mali 1990–2016 All Aid, Health Aid and Maternal and Child Health Aid - Developmental Assistance for Health Database [12]
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Our work is determined by the funding we have. I
take the example of the Mopti project that was implemented in 2013 and early 2014. We wanted to
expand it across the district of Mopti and the Mopti
region. We did not get any funding so it is certain
that the indicators [used to track the services we
were providing] in Mopti decreased, because we did
not have funding. (International NGO employee)
Program planning is highly dependent on donor decisions and constraints imposed by earmarking resources.
The geographical scope could also be determined by the
funder, by the security situation and by the available financial resources. Respondents suggested that organizations mostly make use of available data and national
directives to decide on the details of programs and services to deliver and the implementation strategies, but
not on the types of programs (e.g., nutrition, immunizations, obstetric care) or geographical areas of focus as
these were pre-determined by funders.
In 2016, of the 274 million US dollars in international
assistance funding available for health (30% of all international assistance for the country), only 30% (83.7 M)
was allocated to child health programs and about 20%
(59.5 M) to maternal health, and there has been virtually
no change in the amount of international funds available
for maternal and child health programs in the country
since the conflict started in early 2012.
The disaggregation of funding allocation by programmatic area reveals that resources were immediately
higher at least in the area of child nutrition and there
have been more steady increases in the area of health
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system strengthening, though the amount of resources
was still limited to less than 16 M dollars in 2016. Maternal health funding from international donors has also
been unstable since the conflict began (Fig. 4).
Dramatic decreases in the funding for childhood
immunization between 2010 and 2012 and even further
declines in 2014 are evident from the analysis of the Developmental Assistance for Health Database [12] (Fig. 4).
These declines likely contributed to the important reduction in measles vaccination coverage among children
12 to 23 months in the conflict regions in 2012 (Fig. 5).
Coverage of measles vaccine in the region only increased
again in 2015 and then further in 2017. International
funding for childhood immunizations also increased in
2015 and 2016, in response to the serious measles outbreaks that occurred in northern Mali in all years between 2012 and 2016 (260 cases per year on average)
and again in 2018/2019 (950 cases in 14 months). This is
the highest number of cases of measles in Mali since the
2009/2010 outbreak.
In contrast to the response to the measles outbreaks
described above, coverage of DPT3 vaccine has declined
in conflict regions. In 2015 coverage reached only 30%,
one of the lowest levels since 2001 (Fig. 5). These quantitative findings were supported by our qualitative data
where several respondents cited financial constraints as
a barrier to providing immunizations. It is, however, important to note that financial constraints are one of
many factors affecting immunization rates, and the role
of availability of commodities, access, and security constraints have also been identified by respondents as
strong barriers to service provision, as discussed further
below.

Fig. 4 Mali 1990–2016-Aid Funding for Maternal and Child Health - Developmental Assistance for Health Database [12]
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Fig. 5 Percentage of children (12 to 23 months) who have received measles and DPT3/Penta vaccines in conflict and non-conflict areas - Mali
(2001 to 2018)

It is clear that delays in funding after the conflict
began were compounded by funding reductions that
limited program availability, reduced their duration
and limited the quality of the services delivered.
Changes in funding and delays also forced organizations to enact unplanned adjustments to the programs, which inevitably increased operational costs
both during implementation but also while the organizations struggled to identify new delivery strategies.
For example, access to certain geographies changes
seasonally and timing the delivery of programs accordingly is a strategy to reduce program delivery
costs. Interventions that were planned to be delivered
to areas accessible by car during the dry season have
much higher costs if they are ultimately delivered
during the rainy season as a consequence of funding
delays. In this specific situation, workers had to use
boats to access the areas due to floods; because motorized boats were far more expensive than cars, the
program was entirely delivered using row boats instead, increasing delivery time significantly.
Imagine if you have to work in the Delta this August, September, October. There is water everywhere so you have to use a motorized boat which
requires a liter of fuel to cover one kilometer. So instead of using 15 liters of fuel to drive 100 kilometers with a car, you have to use 100 litres to go the
same distance with a boat. But how are you going
to wait for the dry season? This is often our issue
with partners, funds do not come in time. Yet it is
only between January and June that these areas are
accessible by car. If funding comes late, the areas
are no longer accessible, then we have to use the

phone, the radio or other means of communication.
(International NGO employee)
Programming: scepticism and displacement

Despite the strong influence of funding, there was still
important variability in the resources used to inform the
selection of specific interventions and services, delivery
strategies and geographic scope. Some organizations relied primarily on government reports, some referred to
research evidence, and others based their decisions on
previous experience. Respondents also highlighted the
use of monitoring and evaluation strategies to inform
programming and improve services. Overwhelmingly, respondents maintained that they hoped to deliver services
that reflected the community’s needs, despite our respondents’ clear perception that the funders were primarily responsible for determining programming and for
the funding inflexibility highlighted earlier. They also
demonstrated a clear knowledge of a sound health planning logic that is based on the best available contextual
evidence, despite pragmatic realities often not aligning
with this sound logic.
When determining priorities, we must look at the
problem in terms of the importance of effects on
the population, the capacity that the country has to
address the problem, the potential the intervention
has to make positive changes - we must take all of
these things into consideration when trying to determine priorities. (UN agency employee)
Multiple respondents indicated that the actual planning of service delivery strategies, however, was difficult
because of a perceived inaccuracy of, or mistrust in,
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quantitative estimates of needs. This general lack of trust
in available data stemmed at least in part from a perceived inability of survey methodologies to accurately
capture the needs of a population, with implications for
program planning.
For nutrition, we use the SMART nutritional surveys, surveys that are internationally recognized and
accepted. So yes; they actually influence [program
planning]. For example, last year, the surveys indicated that [a certain number of children were malnourished], after much discussions, and coming to a
consensus, we validated the data together. But the
number of children who need treatment in Mali
had been underestimated, and the resources that
the funders put in place [were not sufficient].
They're giving you what you've asked for, but the
country [programs], therefore, become wobbly with
insufficient resources [to treat all the children in
need], because initially there was that [an underestimate of needs]. (International NGO employee)
Migration and internal displacement contributed to
the perception that data were unreliable. Population
movements during conflict situations often occur rapidly
and are highly responsive to evolving events, and from
the perspective of some of the interviewees, these movements served as a reason to mistrust data, and were
interpreted as another example of inaccurate estimates
of population sizes. That being said, regardless of the interpretation of the phenomenon, under-estimates of
population sizes resulted in shortages of supplies and
commodities.
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Often the stocks that we bring are estimated based
on the needs of 50 or 100 people but then we
realize that the demand is higher, which often results in difficulties. (UN agency employee)

Population health outcomes: gains and losses

Comparative changes in the coverage of health indicators in conflict and non-conflict regions corroborate
many of the perceptions of the organizations interviewed. For example, in contrast to the limited but persistent increases in access to modern contraceptives that
are observed in the non-conflict regions of Mali since
2010, the conflict regions experienced an immediate reduction as the conflict began and only a very modest increase in the last 6 years (Fig. 6).
The qualitative interviews suggested that respondents
believe the conflict had a large impact on family planning services, with many considering it too dangerous to
provide family planning services in the current context,
fearing that they would become targets of jihadist groups
if they delivered these services. This fear did not always
translate into the interruption of such services however,
as some organizations did continue to provide family
planning services. One respondent described how community members would present for family planning services at night in order to circumvent security risks and
societal pressures, and organizations would respond accordingly by providing services at these times. Similarly,
access to antenatal care increased in the non-conflict regions after 2010, had but decreased in the conflict regions (Fig. 7).

Fig. 6 Percentage of women aged 15 to 49, either married or in union, who are using a modern contraceptive method in conflict and nonconflict areas - Mali (2001 to 2018)
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Another complicating factor that coincided with the
conflict in Mali, was USAID’s suspension of funding to
organizations that include provision of abortion services
in any of their programs in any country. This decision
had far-reaching implications and contributed to an even
more difficult situation that impacted programs and services beyond reproductive health. Some respondents described that they needed to choose between providing
abortion services and receiving funding.
With the cuts in the US funding, we were forced to
lay off some of our providers and to even reduce
the scope of our interventions. When funding suddenly stops, it generates a lot of issues. Even the vehicles that had been purchased for the project were
returned to the project [funder]. The motorcycles
were returned to the funder. It reduces the resources in terms of personnel and intervention on
the ground. (International NGO employee)
Respondents believed that many women in Mali
prefer to give birth at home and that sociocultural
norms and societal pressures encourage this practice,
despite the programmatic focus of many organizations
towards increasing facility deliveries. The conflictassociated dangers that women faced when traveling
to a health facility to deliver, respondents suggested,
had made it even less likely that women would give
birth in a facility. Nevertheless, coverage data show
that facility deliveries increased in both conflict and
non-conflict regions even after 2012, although the
rates continue to be much lower in the conflict regions (Fig. 8).
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Although the increase in facility deliveries in conflict
regions may be initially surprising, it is an expected consequence of the high influx of migrant or displaced populations from rural and remote areas to larger cities.
This pattern is evident in the conflict regions especially
during the conflict’s most violent and insecure year, indicated by the number of internally displaced people in
2012 and 2013 (Fig. 1). Administrative data from the annual reports of Mali’s Système Local d’Information Sanitaire (SLIS) reveal that, starting in 2013, there was an
increase in the proportion of the population living
within 15 km and within 5 km of a health facility and an
accompanying reduction in the proportion of the population living more than 15 km away, suggesting migration and/displacement as a likely explanation for these
complementary trends (Fig. 9).
Deliveries attended by skilled health professionals
nevertheless reduced between 2012 and 2015 in conflict
regions, while continuing to modestly but steadily increase in the non-conflict areas (Fig. 10). Similarly, the
percentage of newborns that received postnatal care
within 2 days of delivery was not sustained in the conflict regions immediately after the conflict began, even
though it continued to increase in the non-conflict areas.
The most recent data from 2018 suggest no inequality
between conflict and non-conflict regions (Fig. 11).
Personnel shortages were a persistent issue, especially
for the government health facilities. This may explain
the reduction in the prevalence of deliveries attended by
skilled health professionals in the conflict areas between
2012 and 2015. Even before the conflict started, skilled
birth attendance was lower in the northern regions when
compared to the non-conflict regions, where coverage

Fig. 7 Percentage of women ages 15–49 who had four or more antenatal care visits during the pregnancy that led to their last birth in conflict
and non-conflict areas - Mali (2001 to 2018)
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Fig. 8 Percentage of women (ages 15–49) who gave birth in a health facility (5 years preceding the survey) in conflict and non-conflict areas Mali (2001 to 2018)

continued to increase from 2012 despite the conflict
and political instability (Fig. 10). Since 2015, prevalence of skilled birth attendance has increased in the
conflict regions, although still only reaching 54% of
all deliveries by 2018 in comparison to almost 80% in
the non-conflict regions (Fig. 10). This seems to coincide with two main factors; the government re-gained
control of the major cities in the northern region and
health workers were able to return, and people

continued to migrate into areas with higher population density and closer to facilities (Fig. 9). Although
several factors may explain the differences between
conflict and non-conflict areas, the reversal in the
positive trend in deliveries attended by skilled health
professionals (Fig. 10) observed during the 3 years in
the conflict areas immediately after the conflict
started, contrasts with the continued increase in facility deliveries (Fig. 8), and corroborates the reports

Fig. 9 Proportion of the population by distance to the nearest health facility in conflict and non-conflict areas - Mali (2001 to 2016) Source:
SLIS reports
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Fig. 10 Percentage of (ages 15–49) whose last delivery was attended by a skilled health professional in conflict and non-conflict areas - Mali (2001 to 2018)

from the qualitative interviews about the difficulties
in retaining health workers.
Service delivery: creativity and courage

Organizations’ ability to deliver services in northern
Mali was impacted by the unpredictable and rapidly
changing nature of the conflict. The security situation in certain areas could change quickly and often
respondents reported feeling vulnerable to attacks.
People working in development and humanitarian
organizations were frequently targets in kidnappings,
and this impacted costs as well as recruitment and
retention of health workers. Beyond increasing

insurance costs (and ransom payments), many organizations chose to offer above-market remuneration
for those willing to work in the conflict areas. The
unintended consequence of this was movement of
staff between organizations, leading to service disruption and forcing organizations to continuously recruit and train new staff.
Jihadist groups often made monetary demands to
organizations in exchange for their safe passage and
operations, and different organizations responded differently to these demands. Organizations that refused
to pay often justified their decision by the uncertainty
of any rebel-offered guarantee of safety and also by

Fig. 11 Percentage of babies who received postnatal care within 2 days of childbirth in conflict and non-conflict areas - Mali (2001 to 2018)
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arguing that their limited budgets could only be used
to directly support the delivery of services. Those organizations that agreed to such demands incurred operational cost increases and often had to re-adjust
programming due to the budget impacts. The unpredictability and the volatility of the various actors involved in the conflict in northern Mali increased the
difficulties in sustaining programs. Most organizations
relied on local community member to deliver programs to the communities, but, as illustrated by one
of our respondents, it was not unusual for a community member to enlist with rebel forces.
The [reality] is that you cannot plan an activity and
be sure that it will happen. The other [reality] especially, in the Mali conflict, is that we are in a situation of insecurity where actors keep switching
[sides] overnight. This necessarily impacts [program] implementation activities. You may leave a
[village] today [confident] you have identified a
gentleman who is pro-government and who will facilitate your work. … The next day you come back,
and you may find [the gentleman] has left [to join]
the armed groups that are against the government
and that [now] the people who are pro-government
are his enemies. In these areas, it's really complicated. (International NGO employee)
This level of unpredictability compromised program
delivery and created a complex management problem,
especially for international NGOs that depend on local
support to implement activities. Periodic attacks on vehicles transporting medicines, supplies, and equipment
were also frequent challenges, with transport vehicles
frequently intercepted and the commodities and vehicles
stolen.
I had an UNFPA ambulance stolen from me when I
was bringing a patient with acute appendicitis to the
care center. I had another ambulance that the State
provided to me stolen as well, so you can see that
the conditions we are working in are hard and
people are working against us. (International NGO
employee)
The reduced safety risk of inconspicuous transport
prompted a shift towards the use of motorcycles to
transport health workers and patients, but the government banned the use of motorcycles in certain areas of
the country to limit the circulation of rebel groups,
impacting service delivery. Organizations resorted to
public transport to deliver services, impacting frequency
of service provision and often forcing organizations to
adjust service delivery to coincide with the day after
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jours de foire, local fair days when vendors from rural
areas would travel to the cities to sell their goods. As the
availability of public transportation to and from the cities increased around fair days, the coordination of service delivery and the jours de foire enabled organizations
to expand the reach of their services. In contrast, some
organizations ignored the motorcycle ban, risking their
workers’ safety.
My field agents use the means at their disposal
(cart, bike) to go from village to village, or if the village is 3 kilometers or 5 kilometers [away], they
sometimes take the risk of using a shortcut on a
motorcycle without being seen by security. (Local
NGO employee)
Some organizations used army escorts to guarantee
the safety of their operations, but this lead to complexities in service delivery schedules and reduced time windows. Other organizations preferred to avoid army
protection as they believed that it could increase their
risk of attacks. Due to the volatile nature of the conflict
and of its actors, there was justification for both
approaches.
If we are able to work in Mopti city today, it's because of the armed forces. If the armed forces weren’t present, or if the armed forces decide to leave, I
do not know how confident you would feel. The
presence of the security forces sometimes makes us
feel secure, reassures us, but sometime is a source
of concern. Especially since we know that radical
groups only attack the armed forces. It's for these
reasons that we avoid military combats. Moreover,
if they are the targets and you are among them, you
are more likely to be a target too. (International
NGO employee)
The unpredictability of conflict also made access to
communities inconsistent. In some cases, planned field
visits to deliver equipment and resources had to be cancelled due to road closures, also preventing communities
from accessing care. Many conflict areas were also affected by pervasive interethnic tension between the Dogon and Fulani. This posed a further threat to the
communities and organizations working in those areas,
with respondents perceiving the need to delicately navigate these dynamics, ensuring that they were not perceived as partial to any specific ethnic group.
You have to be careful who you talk to because
people will think you are choosing sides and are
helping the Dogons or the Fulanis. Even though you
aren't picking sides they will assume you are and
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then you are subjecting yourself to an attack even
though you are only trying to provide unbiased
health services. (International NGO employee)
Interethnic tension was reported to be the strongest in
Koro and Bankass towns in Mopti region, with access to
care being particularly limited in these areas.
Sometimes when the [primary health facility] is in
the Dogon area, the Fulani cannot get treatment.
You cannot take care of them. Your life is threatened. And vice versa, there are agents who have
been threatened because they took the Fulani records. Under threats, they were forced to leave.
(Government employee)
Coordination: the key to improving efficiency

As mentioned earlier, collaboration between different
types of humanitarian actors was vital to ensuring service delivery. Organizations use the term faire faire
when referring to the practice of subcontracting local organizations or community members to deliver services
when there are security concerns, but also as a mean to
gain local contextual insights. Faire faire also describes
the ways by which organizations fund local health centres or conduct capacity building activities with local
health staff.
We have areas where there is more representation,
we also have areas where the CSCOMs are not
functional, but that does not mean that we cannot
intervene there. We set up a ‘faire faire’ system,
meaning that, in an area, if we have someone who
can do the work, the [organization] is invited to the
[field office] or to the regional level, is [authorized]
to carry out activities on the area. (Local NGO
employee)
Our data suggest that the initial humanitarian response activities were poorly coordinated, with
organizational isolation and fragmentation of activities
often resulting in the duplication of services. Despite improvements in coordination as the conflict evolved, collaboration between humanitarian actors was still
perceived to be insufficient and government representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the role that the government played in the delivery of humanitarian
activities, arguing that their efforts were not visible.
There is co-ordination between NGOs but there is a
huge gap in this area. And at the moment we find
ourselves in this situation which is not new and very
usual and in which the State does not play its role
in coordinating. Since the roles are no longer well
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defined, the International NGOs even intervene in
the place of the State. Tshese are aggravating factors. I will try not to give the names of NGOs; these
are NGOs that finance everything. And as a result,
the State has nothing to do with it and people see
the NGOs, they do not see the State. It does not
allow for the State to find its place, it creates frustrations at the level of the State. In the current conflict in Mali, the main problem is the security
problem, this is not my domain. It's the army, there
is the Barkhane Program, there is MINUSMA, there
is the Malian Army. This is their domain but I remain convinced that the solution to the problem
will be easier to attain if the State is present and the
people will look after the State. Right now, I think
NGOs are much more visible than the State. (Government employee)
Cluster coordination meetings were valued as a mean
for organizations to stay up to date about the activities
being delivered by other organizations in the region and
also as a source of information on emerging funding opportunities. No respondent was explicitly critical about
the meetings, or about the cluster approach, but some
did note that they preferred not to attend the meetings,
suggesting that their perceived added value is low. The
study team’s own observations during a health cluster
meeting in Bamako in 2018 confirmed the utility of
these meetings for sharing information on the activities
of different organizations and also as a forum to discuss
needs and funding opportunities, but not as a forum for
coordination of action.
Ultimately, fears related to the future of Mali were
palpable during interviews. Several respondents from
local NGOs were concerned that the conflict and instability in Mali would result in international actors leaving. They reported that organizations were becoming
increasingly resistant to sending foreign health workers
to Mali, and these fears were echoes by concerns from
government representatives about the sustainability of
the services provided by external humanitarian actors.

Discussion
Our findings confirm what has been previously described in other settings regarding the complexity of delivering maternal and child health and nutrition services
in conflict-affected areas. Different from populations
who become entrapped in conflict areas, the population
of northern Mali has been mostly displaced, many fleeing their homes for cities both within the region and also
to non-conflict regions. Some previous analysis suggests
that the majority of the displaced population has fled to
the southern regions and more specifically to the capital
city of Bamako, but there is some indication that rural-
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urban migration within the conflict-affected regions was
the norm among the most vulnerable groups [30]. Access to care is a key issue of concern for internally displaced persons (IDPs) [1], which were estimated to
include 47,000 individuals within Mali in late 2018 [6],
but have increased to almost 200,000 people according
to the most recent estimates from OCHA [31, 32].
It is also possible, and likely, that the conflict has affected health system functionality and service delivery
even outside of the insecure areas, but the limited data
available make it difficult to confirm this hypothesis.
Some of our data suggest non-conflict areas may have
benefited from an influx of funding for vaccines into the
country, while data on antenatal care and postnatal care
in non-conflict areas suggest a deceleration of the preconflict progress. However, the extent to which such
trends are a function of the conflict is unknown.
The wide range of international humanitarian actors
that is often observed in other conflict settings has in
fact been more limited in Mali, as the unpredictability of
the conflict and the changing alliances of different interest groups in the region since 2012 have constrained the
operations of large international humanitarian organizations that have had to rely on smaller local organizations
to deliver their programs in Mali. While many of these
large organizations would have delivered health services
directly in non-conflict situations, in the context of the
Mali conflict many have effectively become fund managers with little control over the delivery of the programs that they designed and were funded to deliver.
The smaller, local organizations are essential as they are
often the only ones able to operate in highly volatile and
unsafe areas and the only ones who can access the communities and assess their needs [33]. But such arrangement also carries the weight of increased operational
costs, not only due to the security costs associated with
program delivery in these unsafe areas, but also because
this sub-contracting structure adds an administrative
layer to the program management that would not exist
otherwise.
Moreover, concerns have been raised about the disconnect between the very high administrative capacity of
large NGOs that subcontract the work, and the disproportionate security and other risks borne by local NGOs
that are actually delivering the programs in Mali [34]. In
addition, in their implementing roles, local NGOs consequently have very limited access to non-operational
funds, reducing their capacity to function outside of the
current arrangements [33].
Complicating the coordination of the humanitarian
health response in Mali is the fact that the government
was generally distanced or even excluded from programming discussions and decisions due to varying levels of
uncertainty about the government’s role in the conflict
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and the optics of working with government within certain populations in the conflict areas. The situation continues to evolve and perception of roles is constantly
changing, as it has been throughout the conflict.
It has been stressed that affected communities should
be at the core of the humanitarian system and also central to the decision-making process [35], but this
principle was not mentioned at all during any of the interviews we conducted. References were made to changing needs of the population, and how that was difficult
to address within funding structures, but not to the role
of affected persons in decision-making processes.
Access to services for individuals in Northern Mali is
limited and organizations report that women attempting
to access maternal and child health care in Northern
Mali are concerned since there are reports that Jihadists
monitor health visits to ensure women don’t access family planning services [2]. Estimates from the most recent
humanitarian response plan state that, at present, 1.7
million individuals have compromised access to health
care [6].
Finding solutions to the lack of flexibility and to simplify and increase responsiveness of the current humanitarian health funding structures in Mali have massive
positive impacts on the ongoing and future response by
allowing for a better alignment of activities with the immediate needs emerging in this very dynamic conflict
setting.
Logistical constraints of our study, including timelines
and security concerns, necessitated the use of multiple
teams of data collectors working simultaneously. How
the data collectors were perceived by the respondents
may have influenced the nature of the information that
respondents disclosed. The data collectors were also not
directly involved in the data analysis process. Debriefs
between the data collectors and the project coordinator
help ensured that subsequent interviews responded to
the preliminary findings that emerged, and that the interpretation of the interviews was accurate. The iterative
nature of our qualitative data collection process required
several rounds of training to ensure that our data collectors were obtaining the most relevant information to
meet our study objectives. Even with ongoing training,
interview quality was variable and we ultimately determined that only 25 of the 50 conducted interviews were
of sufficient quality to contribute to our analysis and
findings. Lastly, as with any qualitative study, the
generalizability of our qualitative findings is limited, and
the findings from our interviews focusing on Mopti may
not reflect experiences in other geographies in Mali.

Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the constraints of the prevailing humanitarian health funding mechanisms in Mali
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have been a major barrier to the timely delivery of essential health services to populations in need in Mopti regions, that and the nature of the conflict is likely a key
modifier of how such mechanisms operate. Identifying
the parameters that can minimize perceived investment
risks and increase efficiency in financial flows into conflict zones is crucial to ensuring that the response of humanitarian organizations is effective. Coordination
strategies that include international donors, local government and humanitarian organizations must be improved and would benefit from more structured
guidelines and stronger centralization. The current coordination strategies seem to have resulted, at least in
Mali, in a vicious cycle that undermines authority and
suggests irrelevance. As the conflict in Mali lingers, there
continues to be an urgent need to improve service delivery to conflict-affected populations. Centralized and organized coordination across sectors and humanitarian
actors has the potential to promote accelerated response
to emerging issues, more efficient use of financial and
human resources and more appropriate prioritization of
programs.
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